Mediating Sovereignty in Thomas Hobbes and Margaret Cavendish
Cavendish's discourse on motion can be seen as an extended response to Thomas Hobbes's theories of the same. Cavendish had only the briefest personal encounters with Hobbes throughout her life, but he figures centrally in many aspects of her intellectual production. Hobbes and Cavendish shared a profound investment in the politics and physics of motion.
There are several important studies of motion in Hobbes's philosophy and, more recently, some serious treatment of physics and natural science in Cavendish. 2 This article examines motion in both Hobbes and Cavendish as early attempts to grapple with the concept and material effects of mediation. Further, it is my claim that these early explorations of mediation represent attempts to understand, as well as manage theoretically, the function of sovereignty at a moment when questions of power appeared inseparable from knowledge emanating out of new developments in science and technology. As I will explore further, mediation is a slippery and complicated term. Even at our present moment we are befuddled by a political and social climate seemingly dependent upon mediated informational and material feedback loops. We exist in a global system of decision based in mediated information and images-products of a largely invisible technoscience-that have an almost mysterious power to transmute action and meaning across assemblages of power. Such power is further characterized by abrupt movements and transferences across scales of meaning, from the very small to the very large and abstract: motional schemas that move rapidly between the virtual territories of concepts and into distinct physical realities.
Patchen Markell has argued that the endemic and persuasive force of the conceptual logics or procedures of sovereignty is based on actions that traverse vast scales of meaning. That is, sovereignty is powered by a kind of metaphysical elision-"miraculous exception"-wherein the larger territorial and conceptual functions of sovereignty are activated as abstractions and then mapped as discrete modes of individuated sovereignty. 3 On this ground, mediation offers some fresh terrain to explore the workings of sovereignty. Mediation as such does not have a long critical history. Certainly classical concepts such as mimesis have a place in thinking about mediation in terms of its capacities as a process that transmutes meaning and figure. However, the distinct emphasis on the form of a material intermediary and the immediacy of its effects is a more recent emergence in theoretical discourse. This latter context appears with greater frequency in the midseventeenth century, becoming an area of specific critical interest by the nineteenth century, as Walter Benjamin discovers in his work on Charles Baudelaire. 4 The development of mediation as a critical term over this historical arc is dependent in part on the spread of technoscience leading up to the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, as mediation evolves discursively, it becomes concerned increasingly with the perceptual and psychological aspects of mediation as an action, in tandem with how such effects materialize in the context of social and cultural habitus. 5 As Benjamin observes, it is feedback loops and small actions-the striking of a match, the clicking of a camera shutter, or the speed and stutter of a cinematic reel-that prepare the human sensorium for radical shifts in scale made possible by mediating technologies. 6 Such external impulses and motions also rely on the unresolved immediacy of mediation. Like Baudelaire's poetic memories that emerge simultaneously with the advent of photography, "the attribution of 'permanent traces as the basis of memory' to processes of stimulation is reserved for 'other systems.'" 7 That is, mediation facilitates the effects of information as a series of rapid or even fleeting impressions that enter the psyche and are then recaptured as concepts and effects within larger systems.
A distinctive aspect of mediation theories, then, is the combined focus on quantum effects and macroemergences within a given system. Again, returning to the example of Benjamin's studies of media and mediation at the turn of the nineteenth century, it is the minuscule instances associated with embodied action or perceptual attention that ready the human sensorium for the political aesthetics of transitional technologies. The clicking of the camera shutter becomes a kind of autonomic response that mediates a cognitive adjustment to the social shifts that follow in the wake of photography: pastness captured as an image in the present or a voyeuristic relationship with a simultaneously real and artificial image of the world that, as Susan Sontag notes, changes our basic conceptions of action and participation in the world. 8 The mid-to late seventeenth century in England saw both a radical rethinking of sovereign powers-amid an emerging Commonwealth and a crisis of kingship-and major transformations in mediated knowledge through the developments of a mature print culture and a profoundly intensifying fascination with quantum and distant worlds made possible by new perceptual technologies. Early modern mediation incorporated contemporaneous efforts across political, aesthetic, and scientific spheres that explored the remediation of virtual and scalable forms. The seventeenth century saw the emergence of technologically assisted science that made available for the first time unseen quantum or magnified objects and worlds. This is a moment rife with meaningful collisions between human actants and objects, whose motions seem uncertain and in flux. Much of this interest in scalar motion drew on the ambient energy of the work of technologists such as Robert Hooke, who remapped across scalable forms human and nonhuman agency under a microscope. 9 Hooke's particles are moving, thriving microsubjects "set on liberty." 10 Hooke's images further argue for a new understanding of catastrophe. That is, he illustrates a new level of potential for extreme events of unprecedented scale, a new model that depicts the collision between the unseen (quantum) and the seen (macromateriality) as an utter overturning-in the Greek sense of catastrophe-of a human or even god-driven centeredness of control and power.
Such revolutionary considerations are apparent in Hobbes's reading of the new Commonwealth through perceptual figures and his extensive discourse on motion, both as a physical principle and as a mode for analogizing human action and will. Similar figurations and concerns are also present in the work of Cavendish, whose play with Hooke's "design'd business" of genres and the "figurative motions" of atoms and actors offers a powerful counterresponse to Hobbes's conclusions on mediated motion and the limits of sovereign power. Geometry, mechanics, and early perceptual and cognitive science all appear in various forms throughout Hobbes's philosophy. 13 There is a tendency to view his scientific and mathematical reflections as mere exempla or as the intellectual embroidery of an early modern polymath. Yet some of Hobbes's most important elaborations on individual perception and imagination-including definitions of the collective Commonwealth-rely on extended analogies of perceptual physics. The introduction to the first part of Leviathan, or, The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill (1651) offers a figure of the "Art" of man in terms of an extended automata, or artificial body, in motion. While the "artificiall" component of this image of an animated Commonwealth is significant to Hobbes's program, the "motion" at the heart of this figure is in crucial ways even more vital to the figuration. Figures and theories of motion play a prominent role throughout Hobbes's thought. Yet motion assumes an essential role in Hobbes's attempts to describe the workings of the sovereign, or figurehead, and the contractual actions of the population, or multitude, of the Commonwealth. Life for Hobbes is often reimagined as the "motion" of an "Artificial Animal" or "Artificial soul." 14 In the opening preamble to the first part of Leviathan, the motional artifice renders the "State" as a moving automata that is of "greater stature and strength" than its individuated natural counterpart, "for whose protection and defence it was intended." 15 Hobbes also seems to privilege motion for motion's sake as a principal influence on his understanding of the actions of the sovereign and how they might be translated between the head of state and the body of the Commonwealth. In chapter six of Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes between two forms of motion: "vitall" (involuntary) motion and "Voluntary motion." 16 Involuntary motion is that vital force inherent to all living creatures. 17 "Voluntary motion"-a deceptive moniker given that, for Hobbes, all motion is entirely dependent upon the impact of external objects on the senses-has a direct and essential connection to the imagination. The function of motion on the imagination is further cast as a kind of chaotic and fleeting impression: as all "Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary motion." 18 This feedback loop between the imagination and the pressures of external objects is not only the impetus of all appetite or passion but also an essential force responsible for all that is felt to be "really within us": "As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the reall effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour." 19 This material form, this object of directed "Delight" or "Trouble," is "nothing but Motion" and an "object moving." 20 As scholars of Hobbesian physics have emphasized, there is an important distinction in Hobbes's understanding of the goal of motion. In contrast to an Aristotelian view of motion-a view that in other important ways parallels Hobbes's understanding-motion has no ultimate objective or aim. All motion emerges out of immediacy of action, desire, or need. Motion is for motion's sake.
In this sense, motion has no goal other than the persistence of more motion as a vital principle. This commitment to a vital and yet unorganized flux to motion informs Hobbes's sense of the motive force of life itself: "But if Vital Motion be helped by Motion made by Sense, then the parts of the Organ will be disposed to guide the Spirits in such manner, as conduceth most to the preservation and augmentation of that motion by the help of the Nerves. And in animal motion this is the very first Endeavour, and found even in the Embrio; which while it is the wombe, moveth its limbes with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth it, or for the pursuing of what pleaseth it." 21 Again, "voluntary" here does not suggest a directed objective or self-selecting impetus but rather a state wherein one motional event leads to another, a kind of perpetual inertia of stimuli and respondent motion. Moreover, as Thomas A. Spragens Jr. stresses in his foundational work on motional physics in Hobbes, this position on inertia evolves into a systematic perspective that becomes for Hobbes a "fundamental cosmological vision." 22 Spragens points to some possible connections between Hobbes's physics and his perspective on the undirected striving and chaos of the multitude. And yet, it is worth emphasizing just how dramatically these principles of motion serve not only as analogies for Hobbes but also as vital structures inherent to mediated action. This point is made even more salient since the majority of Hobbes's examples of motional inertia involve the human perceptual system or sensorium: "Nerves," "Organ[s]," and various instances of "Sense."
We see this fundamental action of mediated motion mapped directly onto Hobbes's political theory of the sovereign and the Commonwealth with perhaps the most well-known rendering of that philosophical enterprise: the visually haptic frontispiece to Leviathan. The final frontispiece is an important representation of the idea of the Commonwealth-namely, the discrete bodies of the Commonwealth embodied within the figure of the sovereign king. Yet it was the early fair copy of the same image that Hobbes went to great lengths to have produced as a perceptual enactment of his conception of sovereign function. The fair copy image, which was included in a manuscript presented to Charles II in Paris, is rendered from an optical device that Hobbes had expressed a profound interest in over the course of his career: anamorphosis. 23 This early figure not only depicts the atomized bodies of the Commonwealth subsumed by the image of the king but also gives these atomized subjects delineated aspects, furthering the embodied effects of the image. Moreover, as a fully anamorphic work, the image requires the viewer to position their optical angle differently for each figure in order for the image to resolve into the body of the sovereign.
While the image in total represents Hobbes's condition that the "Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular," the image's mechanics are based in a form of haptic viewing wherein each aspect within the image must be engaged as a medium that enacts the motion of resolving the individual representations into the larger embodiment of the sovereign. 24 As Noel Malcolm has claimed, given Hobbes's extensive interest in anamorphosis as an aesthetic and political object, the earlier image very likely was closer to his primary intentions iconographically. 25 The mediated feedback loop between viewer and the objects of the composed image are performative enactments of a motion for motion's sake in Hobbes's terms. The mediated aspects of the figure facilitate a perceptual enactment of Hobbes's voluntary motion, emanating out of the imaginative territory of the individual psyche and then captured by the figure of the artificial automata of the state. Giorgio Agamben argues that we must understand sovereignty not only as a political concept but also as a kind of "originary structure." 26 To this end, he makes a connection with the German etymology of "ban," here understood as exception or decision in the context of sovereignty. 27 The "ban" is located philologically in the larger influence of Aristotle's dynamis. As Agamben stresses, Aristotle's dynamis is always couched further in the dynamis mē energein: "the potentiality not to pass into actuality." 28 That is, this motional dynamic as a central action of the active power of sovereignty is located in a conceptual etymology encompassing not just motion but specifically a motion that exists as a feedback loop that never actualizes in full. This is a motion that strives not for an actualized outcome but the generation and maintenance of the feedback loop itself, an object of pure mediation that creates a "threshold in which … outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order." 29 As Agamben further explains, this is a structure of sovereign action that we must view as a "kind of relation" and not as a concept or actualized outcome. 30 Hobbes's disagreement with Pierre Gassendi, French atomist and friend to Hobbes while he was in exile abroad, offers further insight into the structural significance of mediated motion as a "kind of relation" within Hobbes's system. Hobbes and Gassendi spent considerable time working out the particulars of the motional aspects to their respective atomistic programs. Lisa T. Sarasohn shows a profoundly significant level of exchange between the two in their attempts to articulate the political and theoretical stakes of such motion. 31 In the case of Gassendi, his interest in reconciling Epicurean atomism to Christian doctrine required that motion be at base a function of free will and providence. Gassendi insisted on maintaining a telos and purpose to the motion of bodies and atoms. By contrast, Hobbes's development of both the physical and psychological aspects of motional materialism during this period made clear that all motion was purely "inertial" and dependent upon a constant mediation between external stimuli and spontaneous reaction. 32 Hobbes and his critics leave little question that his commitment to mechanical science and physics informs a totalizing cosmology of inertia. Amid this worldview, the connection between motion and Hobbes's position on the striving self-interest of the multitude is clear. Power emerges as a relational process that enacts over and again the threshold of mediation. In Agamben's terms, we are left bereft of a conceptual framework for sovereign power in favor of a motional structure mediating between individual perceptual psychology and social action, which readies the collective and individual psyche for the impressions of an "indistinguishable" moment of decision.
Both Kathleen Biddick and Kathleen Davis trace in contemporary sovereign political theories an "absent foundation" to sovereignty. 33 In other words, contemporary accounts of sovereignty rely on a kind of elision of the transition from premodern modes of sovereignty to modern biopolitics. In this account, the "sacrificial" and abject bodies of an earlier theological ritual of expulsion are replaced with descriptions of new biopolitical systems of "quantum" control of individual bodies. 34 The sacrificial body remains present in political sovereign action, Davis and Biddick argue, but is obscured by these narrative sleights of hand that substitute secularized micro control of the body politic for ritualized sacrifice. While Davis and Biddick are primarily interested in how these narratives form up as a temporal displacement of sovereign function, there is a rich trove of material on the concept of the "quantum-biopolitical" for thinking sovereignty alongside a media studies perspective. 35 In many senses, the "quantumbiopolitical" answers to an unexplained capacity for sovereign action to move effectively across scalar registers, shifting between embodied quantum impulses and larger cultural systems. Bernard Stiegler further characterizes mediation in this context as a kind of ultimate mythos of the originary. 36 He locates the distinction between a sense of external time-space and internal time-space-at the level of both the individual unconscious and the collective cultural memory-in terms of our relationship with mediating objects.
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If we consider the impact of technoscience and its media surfaces in the seventeenth century-an influence borne out by Hobbes's intransigence regarding the comprehensive explanatory power of mechanical and secular materialism-then we find a kind of political aesthetics emerging in the wake of mediating technologies. Hobbes's "Voluntary motion" becomes a surrogate for the ritual of the abject. As a mode of reproduction, the feedback loop at the heart of Hobbes's program enacts mediation that is imminent, embodied, and, as Stiegler would argue, inherent to the affects of exteriorization scaled across the unconscious and cultural memory.
MEDIATION AND CAVENDISH'S "FIGURATIVE MOTION[ ]"
Like Hobbes, Cavendish took motional form seriously. Form more generally is not just an aesthetic interest in her work-as in playful variations on romance or poetry-but also a deeply considered point of contact between scientific and literary episte-mologies. In an odd twist, form has come to determine the politics of Cavendish's reception in the contemporary context as well. Editors and publishers since the eighteenth century have actively avoided publishing Cavendish's Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. To which is Added, the Description of a New Blazing World (1666) in the form in which it initially appeared; instead they divide the components of each work based on contemporary demarcations between science, literature, and philosophy. 38 Henry S. Turner has argued for a more nuanced understanding of experimentations with form in the early modern period, such as those we see in Cavendish's oeuvre, and has suggested that form served as a kind of moving ontology in the early modern context. 39 In this sense, we can imagine Cavendish's "Hermaphroditical" text, as she refers to it, as an invitation to something more interesting than forbidden (gendered) excursions into natural philosophy and romance fiction. 40 In Observations, when Cavendish's persona invokes the "design'd business" of the objects under Hooke's telescope-declaring that she does not know if these instruments have not done "the world more injury then benefit" given the "phenomena" that follow in their wake-she is expressing a conflicted fascination with the forms and actions of these media surfaces of her moment. 41 A principal focus of Cavendish's scientific philosophical program, then, centers on an understanding of the distributed powers of the new technoscience, particularly in the case of devices that work across extremes of scaled perception. Her interest in the microscope specifically is driven by worry over how these devices mediate perspectives on the autonomy of bodies in motion. Again, like Hobbes, Cavendish has Epicurean leanings. She too understands atoms in motion to exist in a cosmology encompassing social and political subjects. 42 Throughout a prolific corpus-ranging across epistolary philosophy, lyric, romance fiction, and experimental treatises-Cavendish's most concentrated philosophical idea is motion.
In Observations, Cavendish develops an elaborate program and series of positions on the work of "corporeal figurative motion, or self-moving figurative Matter" across multiple modalities of sensorial and conceptual meaning making. 43 Much in the same way that geometry and motion become significant elements in Hobbes's program, Cavendish deploys an elaborate apparatus to consider the implications of whether motions or perceptions are motivated by external influences or retain autonomy in their movements and impacts. Almost all of her examples are drawn from the experimental philosophy of the moment and its criticsincluding Hooke's Micrographia, René Descartes's philosophy, the Platonic orthodoxy of Ralph Cudworth and, of course, Hobbes's mechanical materialism. The microscopic interface is the most scrutinized technology within her corpus: "Or if Microscopes do truly represent the exterior parts and superficies of some minute Creatures, what advantages it our knowledg? For unless they could discover their interior, corporeal, figurative motions, and the obscure actions of Nature, or the causes which make such or such Creatures, I see no great benefit or advantage they yield to man." 44 The central question for Cavendish regarding the properties of objects mediated under technē, such as the microscope, settles on the extent to which such technologies are sussing out something essential to the perceived objects themselves. Are such motions due to external manipulation, she asks, or are they simply representing the preprogrammed influences of a theological agent? Cavendish points to the potential of these mediating devices to impact deceptively the senses with "patterning," a term that for Cavendish implies information that impacts the sensorium via the "Optick sense" but which does not betray anything essential about a body's actions or essence. 45 Once Cavendish articulates the stakes to such mediation, she moves into a thoroughly comprehensive study of motion. She explores motion as indicative of the intentionality and purpose of bodies and objects. 46 Motional power is at the heart of the political and narrative strategies in both halves of Observations. Cavendish is less critical of the overall meaning making that is produced from technomediators, such as the microscope, than she is of the tendency to reduce such "patterning" as reflective of passive and inert bodies whose mechanisms can be statically defined and mastered. To this end, Cavendish takes up motion in these mediated contexts: "Though Matter might be without Motion, yet Motion cannot be without matter; for it is impossible (in my opinion) that there should be an Immaterial Motion in Nature." 47 Though the Epicurean unit or "atom" is a foundational element of an aleatory materialism, for Cavendish, it is the selfinitiating motion of these bodies that defines their capacities. " [F] igurative motions"-or, at other moments, "self-moving figurative Matter"-are crucial to Cavendish's demonstrations because they reveal the autonomy to Epicurean bodies, even at the level of self-organization. At several points, Cavendish describes how such self-generated motion is related to the translation of material form and impression:
For how can motion, being no substance, but onely a mode, quit one body, and pass into another? One body may either occasion, or imitate anothers motion, but it can neither give nor take away what belongs to its own or another bodies substance, no more then matter can quit its nature from being matter; and therefore my opinion is, that if motion doth go out of one body into another, then substance goes too; for motion, and substance or body, as afore-mentioned, are all one thing, and then all bodies that receive motion from other bodies, must needs increase in their substance and quantity, and those bodies which impart or transferr motion, must decrease as much as they increase: Truly, Madam, that neither Motion nor Figure should subsist by themselves, and yet be transferrable into other bodies, is very strange. 48 Couched in this defense of the autonomy of motion is the idea that there exists a multiplicity or diversity to the substantive elements and effects of motional bodies. Contrary to Hobbes's insistence that all motion is externally produced, chaotic, and wholly undifferentiated, Cavendish strives to retain a distinctive character to individual bodies and their motions. An economy of motion inheres in such relations and is representative of distinctive figures across individual bodies in motion. Motion for motion's sake in a Hobbesian system is translated into an economy of mediated motion that foregrounds telos related to the individuated substance of moving bodies. This system also conserves a multiplicity to such motional figures.
For Cavendish, motional figures are also critical to how perception works between bodies. 49 Perhaps the most controversial claim within Cavendish's philosophical program is that, while motional bodies retain their own intentions within their own organizational and perceptive ecosystem, the images they create emanate directly out of the human sensorium when these objects interact with human perception. Such impressions are distinctive from the empty "patterning" she critiques in the theories of technologists and materialists such as Hooke and Hobbes. The perceptual impacts of corporeal "figurative motions" instead provide for an imaginative experience capable of transmuting meaning across contexts and assemblages: "as the corporeal figurative motions do alter and change, so do particular perceptions; for Perception is a corporeal, figurative action, and is generally in all parts and actions of Nature; and as no part can be without self-motion and self-knowledg, so none can be without perception; and therefore I dare truly say, that all perceptions are made by figuring, though I cannot certainly affirm, that all are made by imitation or patterning." 50 Cavendish explicitly extends the meaningful context for this perspective, born as it is from a philosophical program of mediating technics, to both immediate and "rational" modes of remembrance, defined further as a politics of governance: "[Is there] Remembrance in Sense … I answer, Yes: for Remembrance is nothing else but a Repetition of the same figure, made by the same corporeal figurative motions; and as there is a rational remembrance, which is a repetition of the same figures, made by the rational, corporeal figurative motions, so there is also a sensitive remembrance, that is, a repetition of the same figures, made by the sensitive, corporeal, figurative motions" and "corporeal figurative self-motion, does act and govern, wisely, orderly and easily, poising or ballancing extreams with proper and fit oppositions." 51 Remembrance is nothing more than a "repetition of the same figures" and materializes as a looping or iteration of mediated figures. However, if we compare this mediated motion to Hobbes's system, then we find a further distinction to this threshold. Rather than an undifferentiated motion for motion's sake, Cavendish's motional ecology becomes a kind of network seeking its own depersonalized action of governance. Remembrance emerges from repetitive loops of imagistic information and, as a process in this context, is reminiscent of Benjamin's observations on the relationship between emerging technē and haptic meaning that translates between the perceptual and the social. Cavendish explicitly defines these feedback loops as models to "act and govern, wisely," programs within which motional cycles not only serve the affects of exteriorization but also facilitate balanced "extreams" within the entire system.
We can make even greater sense of the connection between Cavendish's views on sovereign governance and "rational" and "sensitive" "figurative motions" through what she calls the "strongest Motion," self-love. 52 It would be easy to dismiss the appearance of self-love in Cavendish's thought as philosophical embellishment on her more romance-driven narratives. And yet, if we follow this idea closely in terms of her intensive treatment of motion across political and perceptual figures, then we discover in the idea of self-love a near fulfillment of her motional philosophy. In The Worlds Olio (1655), Cavendish describes self-love as a directed motion of the mind that, while potentially corruptible, can form the basis of an ultimate telos of self-governing within more expansive and complex social and political organization:
Self love is the ground from whence springs all Indeavours and Industry, Noble Qualities, Honorable Actions, Friendships, Charity, and Piety, and is the cause of all Passions, Affections Vices and Virtues; for we do nothing, or think not of any thing, but hath a reference to our selves in one kind or other, either in things Divine, Humane, or Natural; for if we part with Life, which is the chiefest good to Mankind, it is because we think in Death there is lesse Pain than in Life, without that we part with Life for; and if we endure Torment which is worse than Death, for any Thing, or Opinion, it is because our Delight of what we suffer for, is beyond all Pains; which Delight proceeds from Self-Love, and Self-Love is the strongest Motion of the Mind. 53 Self-love is described as a "Motion of the Mind" and, while we can detect certainly the coding for an unleashed motion of selfinterest, this inertia is distinct from Hobbes's absolute external striving amid the mob of the multitude. For Cavendish, selflove is not only a motion seeking self-preservation but also-in Deborah Boyle's words-a "sort of public recognition." 54 "Fame" in this context, as Boyle elucidates, is based entirely in Cavendish's secular materialism: the "natural soul" (contrasted with the "divine soul") is composed of "self-moving matter" that then decomposes at death. 55 As such, the "Motion of the Mind" that motivates self-love ultimately serves to further individuate her "figurative motions" as imminent mediations seeking realization in social and political networks. Fame in this sense is a striving for moral recognition behind "doubt of an after being." 56 Hobbes is firmly invested in the secular nature of motion in the interest of the controlling power of an unresolved threshold of decision. Cavendish, by contrast, deploys her secular "Motion of the Mind" as a telos that exceeds the effects of the feedback loop itself. The objectives of these diverse "figurative motions" find realization as individuated actions seeking to balance "extreams." If we return briefly to Cavendish's earlier concerns with the interpretations of "patterning" that accompanied the surface mediations of the microscope, then we can discover in Cavendish's thought a more expansive program for "figurative motions." Cavendish imagines a system of "figurative motions" that generate impressions through feedback loops between human perceptions that also eventually materialize as remembrances. Again, remembrances form a kind of networked governance, wherein motions take on "rational" and "sensitive" individuations within a larger system of meanings and effects.
Annelies Degryse in her work on Hannah Arendt and Hobbes identifies several key points in Arendt's understanding of Hobbesian sovereignty. 57 She highlights how Arendt views Hobbes's "state machine" (what Arendt renames "the Blob") as dependent upon the figure of an almost indistinguishable, seamless behemoth. 58 This massive "Blob" requires complete submission through what Arendt recognizes as a reduction of all human action to the "immediacy" of economic self-interest. 59 She further observes that this particular configuration of economic self-interest blurs all distinctions between private and public interest. For Hobbes, private security is the only public interest. Arendt finds productive resistance to "the Blob" by insisting on a diversity of human action in the public sphere. She also argues for a broad multiplicity to relations that are not wholly dependent upon a narrow interpretation of economics. Familial and social roles constitute an entirely other aspect to participatory political life for Arendt. 60 We can imagine Cavendish's program of governance through self-love as a structural framework anticipatory of the networked participation that Arendt explores as an alternative to the Hobbesian "Blob." Self-love, as it is described in Cavendish's system, argues for individuated action as an alternative to the homogenous "patterning" that informs Hobbes's theories. Moreover, self-love is competitive with the Hobbesian sovereign model in that it is constructed out of the same "self-moving matter" framework that informed the entirety of Hobbes's political physics. Significant here is the fact that both Cavendish and Hobbes render these expansive philosophies in the shadow of the changes wrought by the mediating technologies of the moment. Mediation, as a process that works across the scale of perceptual and social meaning, is the engine that drives both Hobbes's and Cavendish's insights on the motion of public and private self-interest. The distinctiveness to Cavendish's system of "figurative motions" relies on a subtle rereading of key moments when one form of motion is allowed to shift its meaning across a threshold that links perceptual psychology to larger conceptual effects-what Benjamin would describe as the readying of the human sensorium for new material and conceptual realities.
THE STACK: CONTEMPORARY MEDIATED SOVEREIGNTY
One of the most exciting contributions to sovereignty studies in the twenty-first century is Benjamin H. Bratton's recent work on the collision between old forms of territory and power and newer digital clouds and forms of digital feudalism. He calls this nascent intermingling of digital vertical spaces and horizontal territory "the stack." 62 In a phrase that almost seems an echo of Hobbesian experimentalist discourse, Bratton demonstrates how we are encountering a world of weird geometries of political control and aesthetics with territories that are now moving ontologies of the virtual-digital. We are at the edges and nodes of a world created out of Westphalian boundaries, now scaled over horizontal, largely invisible stacks of codes and protocols and the interfaces of virtual territories. Mediation again plays a critical function in understanding how such assemblages function as sovereign systems.
Bratton describes a polyscalar and complex system of highspeed computational platforms in constant exchange with more traditional material territories and boundaries, an "oscillation between the real-but-as-yet-unnamed and the imagined-but-asyet-not-real." 63 The deep reconfiguration of actual and virtual objects within this system-and the rapidity within which "laws" and "lines" are remade-results in a kind of "algorithmic" governance wherein our everyday computational "surfaces" are platforms for the remediation of "automated sovereignty over decisions of inside and outside." 64 As he stresses, we are encountering an environment of mediated sovereignty that enacts almost indecipherable geometries of control. Yet again, there is a structure inherent to this system that is at once imminent and historical. Bratton calls this structural relation the "blur," conjuring the motion and speed at which actual and virtualized imagistic information is coded, mapped, and remapped. 65 He further identifies an operational framework for this system that relies on the motion of "two concurrent images that we must hold in mind at once," a kind of "double exposure," as he calls it elsewhere. 66 This double exposure of control and decision in the new "state machine" is comprised of constantly mediated motion between all layers of the "stack": "The unseen and arrived is interlaced with the seen and delayed." 67 Bratton describes a kind of acceleration to mediation that blurs the distinction between past and future to such an extent that the threshold of action or decision is made invisible. As Bratton argues, we are in the midst of an opaque and almost unmappable sequence of mediating motions that obscure contemporary sovereignty's workings. However, he does outline some optimism in the form of redesigning our habits of reading in time and space-at one point playfully regarding such shifts as a form of "squinting."
68 He suggests strategies for identifying all the layers of an image at once, reading for "what they are and what they do." 69 I would argue that one critical approach to managing the "blur" of mediated sovereignty can be found in alternative articulations of mediated sovereignty in the early modern period. If we can resist the tendency to rationalize earlier models of sovereignty along the spectrum of classical and modern conceptual territories and instead seek out instances of the "quantum-biopolitical," then we might enrich our interpretive apparatus. As a closing observation, I return to the promise in this vein of someone such as Cavendish.
Benjamin illuminates some potentially disruptive and transversal possibilities to the fleeting impacts of mediated information. Richard Grusin returns to the power of such thinking in his work on premediation in the contemporary moment. 70 Grusin invokes Benjamin's speculations on the power of the Spielraum in exploring both mediation and how certain iterations and loops can betray the systems that produce and maintain them. 71 The spiel and the Spielraum are cycles and spaces of predictable loops and gestures that can also become events of serious play. 72 We can imagine that if a text such as Cavendish's Observations would be allowed its own formal currency-to be produced and read as a hybrid and layered intervention into mediated knowledge-then we could detect in her work serious attention to seventeenth-century sovereign discourse. The many facets of Cavendish's many genres, read as iterative variations on her broader philosophy, function as a kind of Spielraum for reading the "blur" and "stack" of the sovereign machine. Reading for the "after" of "after sovereignty" may require our own hard "squint" across Cavendish's technoscientific texts as newly productive returns on the past.
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